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Abstract 
The Cameroon government imposes charges on citizens and corporate bodies called taxes in a bid to raise funds 
to pay for public services or facilities. It also uses taxation in the redistribution of wealth, and in encouraging or 
discouraging the consumption of some goods and services. In a circular No. 001/C/MINFI of 2nd January 2018 by 
the Ministry of Finance of Cameroon, stringent measures were undertaken regarding the detection of “concealed” 
income or tax evasion, a phenomenon that stifles government efforts in realising its tax objectives. As a 
consequence, this study sought to investigate the causes of tax evasion in Cameroon and propose remedies. Data 
was collected through a survey carried out in the cities of Douala, Bafoussam and Bamenda, and analysed using 
the Ordinary Least Square (OLS) estimation technique. The empirical results were of positive and statistical 
significance and revealed that tax evasion in Cameroon is caused by high tax rates, complex and opaque tax laws, 
inefficient and corrupt tax inspectors, low income of taxpayers, evasion benefits outweighing detection penalties, 
poor perception of the judicial system and dissatisfaction with the quality and magnitude of public services and 
goods. Remedies proposed were that there should be a reduction and clear justification of tax rates, simplification 
of tax laws and effective education of taxpayers, creation of a more conducive business environment to boost 
business income, raise tax penalties, identify and deal with inefficient and corrupt tax authorities, liberate the 
judiciary to be truly independent to show proof of fairness and transparency in the treatment of tax matters and 
politicians being transparent and accountable for their decisions and use of public money. Tax ethics should be 
introduced and enforced in schools in order to build a culture of tax compliance in citizens, assiduity and honesty 
in tax authorities, and transparency and accountability in politicians and everyone in public offices. 
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1. Introduction 
Taxation denotes the practice of governments imposing charges on citizens and corporate bodies in a bid to raise 
funds to pay for public services or facilities such as national defence and security, public health, road construction 
and maintenance, courts, schools, libraries, and parks. A government may also use taxation in the redistribution of 
wealth. It is one of the most acclaimed discussions during top-level political debates in both developed and 
developing countries. Through taxation, governments could encourage or discourage the consumption of any good 
or service. Every taxpayer in Cameroon is required to fill and submit a tax return to the taxation office in the 
taxation area of concern. The exception to this are taxpayers who are fully taxed at source such as civil servants, 
employees of public corporations and public establishments, regional and local authorities. 
Tanzi and Zee, (2001) describe taxation as the only practical means of raising revenue to finance government 
spending on the goods and services that most people demand. To set up an efficient and fair tax system for 
developing countries has ever been overwhelmed with formidable challenges. Some of the challenges stem from 
the fact that most workers are typically employed in agriculture or in small, informal businesses without accurate 
records, thus making income and consumer tax calculations unreliable. According to the Vito and Zee (2001), an 
ideal tax system in a country like Cameroon should be one ttthat can raise essential revenue without excessive 
government borrowing, and should do so without discouraging economic activity and without deviating too much 
from tax systems in other countries. 
A sound taxation system leads to a strong, sustained and inclusive economic development when the revenue 
funds public expenditure on physical, social and administrative domain enabling businesses to start or expand. A 
sound tax or revenue system is also pivotal in supporting a strong citizen-state relationship that culminates effective, 
accountable and stable governments (Carnahan, 2015). 
One of the greatest challenges faced by the Cameroon tax system today is the problem of tax evasion, a 
phenomenon which occurs when efforts are made by individuals, firm’s trusts and various other entities to avoid 
paying taxes by illegal and unfair means. Usually, this takes place when taxpayers deliberately hide their incomes 
from the tax authorities in order to reduce their tax liability, Devarajappa (2017). Tax evasion involves the 
deliberate act of noncompliance to tax legislation and the disregard of tax payments from the citizens, Drogalas et 
al. (2018). Withholding information regarding one’s income in order to pay less tax deprives the government of 
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the much-needed income to provide public goods and services.  
The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) describes the concept of tax evasion 
as an illegal arrangement where tax liabilities are either hidden or ignored. That is, the taxpayer pays less tax than 
he/she is legally obliged to pay by concealing income or information from the tax authorities.. Given the 
importance of tax revenue in the provision of public services, a country increasingly plagued by tax evasion is 
likely to exhibit a low productive investment mix, hence low economic growth as the public-run enterprises would 
be negatively affected (Dalu et al. 2012). 
Tax evasion is criminal and has a lot of negative social and economic consequences. It deprives the 
government of substantial revenue and also leads to uneven distribution of tax burdens. In order to bridge the gap, 
the government may be tempted to raise taxes which in turn slow down economic growth and place extra load on 
loyal taxpayers. 
In Cameroon, the public sector accounting and finance is managed by the Ministry of Finance (MINFI). It 
ensures the preparation, approval and implementation of the government budgets, and the preparation of the public 
sector financial reports for audit and publication (Mukah, 2015). In light of this, MINFI undertakes strict measures 
regarding the detection of “concealed” income. In a circular No. 001/C/MINFI of 2nd January 2018, the Minister 
of Finance issued instructions relating to the execution of finance laws, the monitoring and control of the execution 
of the budget of the State, public corporations and public establishments, regional and local authorities and other 
subsidised bodies, for the 2018 financial year. Conscious of the fact that tax evasion has become a common practice, 
the circular carried certain measures relating to the fight against tax fraud and evasion.  
The circular called for an improvement in the methods of collecting tax information by providing information 
about persons who may be liable to pay taxes, duties or levies to tax authorities by every public or private body; 
encouraging the visitation of tax administration with a view to strengthening its powers of action in the fight 
against fraud; and a reinforcement of communication with tax authorities with regards to transfer prices of all kinds 
between intra-group companies. Such improved communication was to make way for better programming of tax 
controls based on previously identified risks (MINFI, 2018).  
The circular also called for the strengthening of collaboration between the taxpayers and the customs 
administration so as to curb tax evasion. To attain this, one of the strategies is to present a receipt showing payment 
of duties at the Directorate General of Taxation before a clearance certificate for imported second-handed vehicles 
is issued. Also, through the external constraint procedure, internal taxes and duties owed by an importer can be 
subject to recovery by the Customs Revenue Collector.  
Given all these worries and efforts expressed by the Ministry of Finance with regards to financial 
accountability and management in Cameroon, given the devastating consequences of tax evasion on the economy 
of Cameroon, the study sought to investigate why some taxpayers in Cameroon evade the payment of taxes and 
what remedies there are to curb or mitigate the situation. To attain this, the following research questions were 
designed: 
i. What are the causes of tax evasion in Cameroon? 
ii. What are the remedies to tax evasion in Cameroon? 
The main objective of the paper was to investigate the causes and remedies of tax evasion in Cameroon. The 
specific objectives were stated as follows: 
i. To investigate the causes of tax evasion in Cameroon, and 
ii. To seek remedies to tax evasion in Cameroon. 
The rest of the paper presents a review of related literature, the methodology applied, analysis and discussion 
of the results, policy implications and a conclusion. 
 
2. Review of Related Literature 
The concept of tax evasion denotes a deliberate omission on a tax return, not filing a tax return or non-payment of 
all taxes due. In tax evasion, the taxpayer deliberately and illegally escapes payment of taxes through fraudulent 
practices such as underestimation of taxable income, exaggeration of expenses and losses, nondisclosure of 
material facts and non-payment of taxes (Kalpana, 2016). Tax evasion embroils the deliberate act of not complying 
with tax legislation and the disregard of tax payments from the citizens (Drogalas et al. 2018).  
There are legal and moral implications when information regarding a tax payer’s income is withheld, or when 
there is a dishonest submission of a tax return involving undeclared income (McGee and Rossi, 2006). The concept 
of tax evasion according to the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development - OECD (2017) is 
commonly used to describe unlawful arrangements where tax obligations are either concealed or ignored, thus 
making the taxpayer to pay less tax than he is legally obliged to pay. 
Martinez-Vazquez and McNab (2003) argue that the existence of a ‘social norm’ of compliance and an 
effective public service-oriented tax administration are crucial in determining tax evasion. Every taxpayer expects 
a fair service from the government for taxes paid. The more the service received the more tax compliance. 
Contrariwise, in a country where the government wastes the taxpayers’ money as a result of corruption and other 
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inefficiencies, tax evasion is bound to prevail. According to Dalu, Maposa, Pabwaungana, and Dalu (2012) 
taxpayers aim at minimising their financial position and will continue to evade taxes as long as the benefits from 
delinquency outweigh the risk of detection and penalty. The application of severe penalties may not be a solution 
given that many tax evasions are not detected due to taxpayers’ interference with tax authority through corruption 
and bribery.  
Tax avoidance is another related concept. It is defined by the Oxford Dictionary of Accounting (2010) as 
minimising tax liabilities legally and by means of full disclosure to the tax authorities. This definition is 
corroborated by Gooch and Williams (2015) as the lawful arrangement or planning of one’s affairs so as to reduce 
tax liability. Xuereb (2015) stating Lord Nolan, in the case of IRC versus Willoughby (1997), revealed that tax 
avoidance covers instances where the intention and policy of the lawmaker failed to anticipate and reach the 
transaction under consideration. This suggests that the taxpayer reduces his tax liability without suffering the 
economic consequences intended by the Parliament to be suffered by any taxpayer who qualifies for such a drop 
in tax liability (Christians, 2017). 
Many at times the concepts of tax evasion and tax avoidance are erroneously used interchangeably. According 
to Elliffe (2011), the former UK Chancellor of the Exchequer Denis Healey once described the difference between 
these two concepts to be like the thickness of a prison wall. Such a quote explicitly illustrates that whereas tax 
avoiders are found on the outside of the prison wall, some tax evaders are incarcerated inside. This denotes that 
tax evasion is criminal whereas tax avoidance is not. It also portrays that tax avoidance though not a crime, may 
be very close to tax evasion to have a common feature like dispossession of the government of the much-needed 
tax revenue. 
Drogala et al. (2018) advise against the use of the concepts, tax ethics and tax evasion interchangeably. 
According to them, tax ethics denotes the moral responsibility of the taxpayer to pay taxes. They hold the view 
that this moral obligation is affected by the relationship existing between the taxpayer as a citizen, and the 
government. Torgler and Schneider (2009) induce that where the tax ethics is low, probably as a result of a poor 
relationship between the taxpayers and the government, tax evasion rises. Tax ethics is affected by non-monetary 
inducements that motivate taxpayers as the public to comply with tax legislation as they enjoy a better relationship 
with the government (Olsen, Kang, and Kirchler, (2012). Although not specified, this relationship could be 
observed in the quality and quantity of public services and goods provided by the government to its taxpayers and 
citizenry. 
On the other hand tax compliance is the filing of all required tax returns at the appropriate time. Such returns 
truthfully report tax liability in accordance with the appropriate tax laws at the time of filing the returns, Roth et 
al. (1989). Consequently, tax compliance comprises reporting income, and paying all taxes in accordance with the 
applicable laws, regulations, and court decisions, Alm (1991). Franzoni (2000) expounds further to say that tax 
compliance characteristically means true reporting of the tax base, accurate calculation of the liability, timely filing 
of the returns and payment of the amounts outstanding. The General tax code in Cameroon provides that every 
registered business in Cameroon files in its tax returns by March 15. When this is not done, tax noncompliance is 
said to set in. 
Benefit theory is one of the theories closely associated with tax accounting in general and tax evasion in 
particular. According to Merriam Webster Dictionary, benefit theory of taxation requires that taxes be considered 
as payments for services rendered by the state to the taxpayers and so should be proportioned. This infers that the 
more benefits a person derives from the activities of the state, the more he should pay taxes to the government. 
This principle has suffered severe reproach on the grounds that it opposes the basic principle of taxation which 
according to Adam (1950), requires subjects of every state to contribute towards the support of the government, 
as nearly as possible, in proportion to their respective abilities.  
Another criticism of the benefit theory stalks from the fact that most of the expenditures incurred by the state 
are for the general benefit of its citizens, and it is not conceivable that the benefit enjoyed by a particular individual 
every year can be estimated. Furthermore, if the benefit theory of taxation was really feasible, then the poor will 
pay heavier taxes than the rich since they benefit more from the services of the state than the rich. If the poor lose 
more money than the rich by way of taxes, this will be against the principle of justice and equity. The equity 
principle requires that every taxpayer should pay tax in proportion to his or her income. The rich should pay at a 
higher rate than the poor (Jhingan, 2004). Unless a tax is based on the ability of the taxpayer to pay, it cannot be 
considered equitable or just (Anyanfo, 1996).  
The cost of service theory is closely related to the benefit theory. It requires each taxpayer to sustain the cost 
of any public service or good consumed. This may be applicable to goods and services such as water, electricity, 
communication, transportation, and postal services whose prices in relation to consumption are easy to determine. 
However, most expenditure incurred by the state such as the police and the army cannot easily be determined and 
allocated to individuals. In addition, the cost of the services rendered by the state is a direct function of the 
efficiency of the government. That is, if the public administrators are efficient, the cost of public goods and services 
too will be lower. The contrary is true, and it will be an aberration to shift the cost of inefficient public 
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administrators to taxpayers. 
A study carried out by Vythelingum, Soondram, and Jugurnath, (2017) to assess the tax morale among 
Mauritian taxpayers revealed that, tax compliance increases when the public has faith in the tax and legal systems 
being stable, fair and transparent and effectively fights against corruption. In a related study by Drogalas et al. 
(2018), tax evasion steps up when taxpayers believe that public money is not efficiently allocated by the 
government to its citizens. That is, when taxpayers feel discontented as a result of the way public resources are 
squandered, they tend to evade taxes. In this regard, they recommended a legal framework that makes politicians 
accountable for their decisions and the use of public money. In their opinion, such a legal framework rebuilds the 
trust between the government and its citizens. 
In studying the causes of tax evasion and corruption in the Indian income tax system, Arora and Vanita (2010) 
disclosed that high tax rates, social acceptance of tax evasion, poor tax evasion detection mechanisms, low tax 
ethics, and corruption, constitute the main reasons why evasion thrives in India. The study furthermore revealed 
that the income tax authorities apart from being morally bankrupt, wielded excessive discretionary powers that led 
to corruption. As a remedy, they proposed the justification of tax rates, simplification of tax regulations and laws. 
They also encouraged an extensive application of the tax system where tax is deducted at source, and proper 
processing and dissemination of tax information, in a bid to step up tax compliance.  
In the same light, Wadhwa and Pal (2012) in carrying out forensic accounting and fraud examination in India 
opined that high and multiple tax rates, corrupt and inefficient tax authorities are the principal causes of tax evasion. 
They proposed the reduction of tax rates, simplification of tax laws, sanitation of the tax system, and proper 
processing of tax information as a remedy to reinstate tax compliance. 
In a study conducted in the ten regional capitals of Ghana of the factors that influence tax evasion behaviour 
in the country, Ameyaw and Dzaka (2016) disclosed that high tax rates, low probability of detecting tax evasion 
and imposing of penalty on evaders, income level fluctuations, demographic characteristics such as gender, age, 
race and educational level are the key factors that thwart tax compliance. As a remedy to tax noncompliance, they 
saw the need for governments, stakeholders and policymakers to come out with pragmatic measures such as tax 
rates reduction believed to enhance and boost revenue generation, hence tax net that captures many taxpayers into 
tax compliance. Tax rates reduction spreads the tax burden from a few loyal individuals to many more taxpayers. 
In the same light with Fishlow and Friedman (1994), Ameyaw and Dzaka (2016) posit that higher penalties act as 
a deterrent and help to improve tax compliance. They also proposed an increase in tax education of taxpayers of 
changes in tax legislation and a serious check on the tax system loopholes such as corruption.  
According to Tanzi (1983), generally, tax rates constitute a primary determinant of tax evasion. Empirical 
shreds of evidence have yielded diverse results ranging from neutral effect to significantly positive and negative 
effect on tax evasion. Allingham and Sandmo (1972) revealed that there exists a statistically significant positive 
effect of tax rates to tax evasion. 
 
3. Methodology 
Cameroon is a Central African country on the Gulf of Guinea. According to the World Health Organisation (WHO) 
2016 statistics, it has a population 23,439,000, WHO (2019). It has Douala as its economic capital and Yaounde 
as its political capital. The population for the study was taxpayers in Douala, Bafoussam, and Bamenda. Douala is 
the economic capital of Cameroon and is located on the estuaries of the Wouri River. It is the capital of Wouri 
Division. It harbours the main seaport of Cameroon that provides services to the Central Africa sub-Saharan region 
and some of the member states of the Communauté Économique des États d'Afrique Centrale (CEMAC) countries. 
According to Ngoran (2014), Douala city harbours some 80% of Cameroon's industries. This suggests that through 
taxation, the government should generate a lot of income from Douala. Bafoussam is the capital of Mifi Division 
and largest city of the West Region of Cameroon. After Yaounde and Douala, Bafoussam is the 3rd most business 
inclined city in Cameroon. Bamenda is the biggest city in the English speaking region of Cameroon. It is the capital 
of Mezam Division and also, the capital of the North West Region.  
The research design adopted was a survey research design. A total of 500 copies of questionnaire were 
administered at random to taxpayers in the cities of Douala, Bafoussam and Bamenda. 351 respondents filled and 
returned the questionnaire giving a response rate of 70.2%. The first part of the questionnaire carried the bio-data 
of participants comprising: gender, age, occupational status, educational level, and marital status. Respondents 
were asked to express their level of perception to statements regarding tax evasion at a five-scale Likert type scale 
rated as follows: (1) Strongly disagree, (2) Disagree, (3) Not decided, (4) Agree, (5) Strongly agree. The objective 
was to get the perceptions of the taxpayers on tax evasion in these cities. 
From the data collected through questionnaire arithmetic means and standard deviation were used to analyse 
the findings. The standard deviation ensures the determination with greater accuracy the location of the values of 
a frequency distribution in relation to the mean. The sufficiently large sample size (>30) led to the application of 
the central limit theorem. The central limit theorem holds that if a population is not normally distributed with an 
increase in sample size, the distribution of the sample mean approaches normality, Henry (1990).  
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A regression model to present the relationships between the dependent variable (tax evasion in Cameroon) 
and explanatory variables was presented as follows: 
 
TEC = f(HTR, COTL, ICTI, PPS, LI, EBODP, PJS), and the econometric expression is as follows: 
TECi = β0 + β1HTRi + β2COTLi + β3ICTIi + β4PPSi + β5LIi + β5EBODPi + βPJSi + λi 
Where:   
TEC = tax evasion in Cameroon; HTR = high tax rates; COTL = complex and opaque tax laws; ICTI = inefficient 
and corrupt tax inspectors; PPS = poor public services; LI = low income; EBODP = evasion benefits outweigh 
detection penalties; PJS = perception of the judicial system; β0 = Intercept; β1, β2, β3, β4, β5 and β6 = Parameters 
coefficients to be estimated for the variables in the regression equation; λ = Error or disturbance term with its 
assumed normality. 
STATA 12.0 version was used to analyse the data. The model coefficients were estimated using the Ordinary 
Least Square (OLS). The apriori expectation of the estimated parameters was that β1, β2, β3, β4, β5, and β6 were 
to be greater than zero to suggest the existence of a positive functional relationship between the independent 
variables and tax evasion in Cameroon. The regression results of the determinants of tax evasion were estimated 
using the ordered logit estimation technique. In the interpretation of the coefficients, a negative value will suggest 
that individuals will not pay all their taxes, hence indicating the likelihood of a rise in tax evasion. 
 
4. Presentation and Analysis of Results 
The discussion begins with a characterisation of the determinants of tax evasion. Table 1 shows the various 
schemes through which tax evasion is carried out in Cameroon. They are: keeping of fake invoices and sales record, 
concealing profits by understating income and overstating expenses, submission of fake returns, making claims to 
fictitious deductions, and bribing and corrupting tax authorities. 
Table 1. Tax evasion schemes  
Taxpayers do not declare all income 
because: 
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Not 
decided 
Agree Strongly 
agree 
Total 
a) They keep fake invoices and sales 
records. 
88 
25% 
56 
16% 
14 
4% 
102 
29% 
91 
26% 
351 
b) They conceal profits by understating 
income and overstating expenses 
60 
17% 
67 
19% 
24 
7% 
105 
30% 
95 
27% 
351 
c) Submission of fake returns 39 
11% 
52 
15% 
39 
11% 
116 
33% 
105 
30% 
351 
d) They make claim to fictitious 
deductions 
35 
10% 
74 
21% 
105 
30% 
63 
18% 
74 
21% 
351 
e) They bribe and corrupt tax authorities 
70 
20% 
45 
13% 
70 
20% 
85 
24% 
80 
23% 
350 
Source: Authors’ computation 
Concerning keeping fake invoices and sales record as a way to evade tax, 25% of the respondents strongly 
disagreed; 16% disagreed; 4% undecided; 29% agreed and 26% strongly agreed. With regards to concealing profits 
by understating income and overstating expenses, 17% of the respondents strongly disagreed; 19% disagreed; 7% 
undecided; 30% agreed and 27% strongly agreed. With respect to submitting fake returns as a means of evading 
tax, 11% of the respondents strongly disagreed; 15% disagreed; 11% undecided; 33% agreed and 30% strongly 
agreed. Regarding making claims to fictitious deductions as a means of evading tax, 10% of the respondents 
strongly disagreed; 21% disagreed; 30% undecided; 18% agreed and 21% strongly agreed. With respect to bribing 
and corrupting tax authorities as a way of evading tax, 20% of the respondents strongly disagreed; 13% disagreed; 
20% undecided; 24% agreed and 23% strongly agreed. 
Appendix 1 titled determinants of tax evasion in Cameroon, presents the descriptive results. The respondents 
used each variable presented in the questionnaire to perceive the effect on tax evasion. Respondents gave their 
perceptions as strongly disagree, disagree, not decided, agree or strongly agree with each variable capturing tax 
evasion.  
Appendix 1(a) considers the various elements of a high tax rate as a justification of tax evasion. The elements 
were: lack of enough money to pay all the tax; tax rate being too high compared to the income made, and many 
taxes to pay. Concerning lack of money to pay all the tax, 13% of the respondents strongly disagreed; 20% 
disagreed; 7% undecided; 29% agreed and 31% strongly agreed. With respect to very high tax rate compared to 
income, 5% of the respondents strongly disagreed; 11% disagreed; 6% undecided; 41% agreed and 37% strongly 
agreed. Regarding many taxes to pay, 17% of the respondents strongly disagreed; 8% disagreed; 11% undecided; 
21% agreed and 43% strongly agreed. 
Appendix 1(b) considers the complexity and opaqueness in the tax laws as a justification for tax evasion. The 
items considered as complex and opaque tax laws were: tax laws not understood; tax regulations being too many 
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and confusing; calculation not easy to understand and copies of the tax code or law being available only to the tax 
inspectors. Concerning the tax laws not being understood as a justification of tax evasion, 9% of the respondents 
strongly disagreed; 12% disagreed; 13% undecided; 32% agreed and 34% strongly agreed. With respect to tax 
regulations being too many and confusing, 10% of the respondents strongly disagreed; 13% disagreed; 8% 
undecided; 33% agreed and 36% strongly agreed. Regarding calculation not easy to understand, 4% of the 
respondents strongly disagreed; 6% disagreed; 1% undecided; 22% agreed and 67% strongly agreed. Concerning 
copies of the tax code/law being available only to the tax inspectors as justification for tax evasion, 1% of the 
respondents strongly disagreed; 4% disagreed; 12% not decided; 25% agreed, and 58% strongly agreed.  
Appendix 1(c) shows the result of inefficient and corrupt tax inspectors (ICTI) as a reason for tax evasion. 
The components of inefficient and corrupt tax are: taxpayers not having trust in tax inspectors; taxpayers can easily 
bribe out their way; they can easily negotiate with tax agents; tax auditors/ inspectors don’t question amount 
declared and tax agents are kind and accept pleas. 21% of the respondents strongly disagreed not having trust in 
tax inspectors as a justification of tax evasion; 19% disagreed; 9% undecided; 22% agreed and 29% strongly agreed. 
With respect to taxpayers easily bribing out their way, 16% of the respondents strongly disagreed; 20% disagreed; 
24% undecided; 19% agreed and 21% strongly agreed. Regarding negotiating with tax agents easily, 17% of the 
respondents strongly disagreed; 22% disagreed; 5% undecided; 24% agreed and 32% strongly agreed. For tax 
auditors/inspectors not questioning amount declared, 32% of the respondents strongly disagreed; 20% disagreed; 
13% not decided; 17% agreed; 18% strongly agreed. As concerned tax agents being kind and accepting pleas, 20% 
of the respondents strongly disagreed; 15% disagreed; 25% not decided; 19% agreed; 21% strongly agreed. 
Appendix 1(d) shows the result of poor public services (PPS) as a justification for tax evasion. This 
component was broken down into taxpayers do not know what government does with the tax income; government 
not adequately protecting lives and property of its citizens; government health services generally being poor; roads 
being without maintenance for long, and biased government expenditure. Concerning taxpayers not knowing what 
the government does with tax income as a justification of tax evasion, 12% of the respondents strongly disagreed; 
8% disagreed; 1% undecided; 38% agreed and 41% strongly agreed. With respect to the government not adequately 
protecting lives and property, 10% of the respondents strongly disagreed; 13% disagreed; 6% undecided; 34% 
agreed and 37% strongly agreed. Regarding government health services generally being poor, 20% of the 
respondents strongly disagreed; 13% disagreed; 8% undecided; 26% agreed and 33% strongly agreed. For roads 
being without maintenance for long, 10% of the respondents strongly disagreed; 19% disagreed; 4% not decided; 
38% agreed, and 29% strongly agreed. As concern biased government expenditure, 19% of the respondents 
strongly disagreed; 16% disagreed; 20% not decided; 23% agreed, and 22% strongly agreed. 
Appendix 1(e) characterises the elements that constitute low income (LI) as a justification for tax evasion. 
The components of low income are the high fluctuation of business income; income being too low most of the 
time; low business sales; and cost of sales and/or cost of production being too high. Business income fluctuating 
a lot as a justification of tax evasion, 12% of the respondents strongly disagreed; 23% disagreed; 1% undecided; 
35% agreed and 29% strongly agreed. With respect to income being too low most of the time, 18% of the 
respondents strongly disagreed; 19% disagreed; 5% undecided; 27% agreed and 31% strongly agreed. Regarding 
low business sales, 17% of the respondents strongly disagreed; 18% disagreed; 9% undecided; 32% agreed and 
24% strongly agreed. As concern cost of production being high, 23% of the respondents strongly disagreed; 12% 
disagreed; 11% not decided; 30% agreed, and 24% strongly agreed. 
Appendix 1(f) shows the result of tax evasion benefits outweighing the detection and penalty (EBODP) as a 
justification for tax evasion. The components are: more profit being made through evasion; easy settlement when 
caught, and penalty of evasion being easily paid. With respect to businesses making more profits through evasion 
as a justification of tax evasion, 20% of the respondents strongly disagreed; 13% disagreed; 14% undecided; 41% 
agreed and 12% strongly agreed. With respect to easy settlement when caught, 15% of the respondents strongly 
disagreed; 21% disagreed; 13% undecided; 24% agreed and 27% strongly agreed. As concern the fact that penalty 
for evasion can easily be paid as a justification for evasion, 12% of the respondents strongly disagreed; 17% 
disagreed; 9% not decided; 32% agreed, and 30% strongly agreed. 
Appendix 1(g) shows the result relating to tax ethics as perceived by the respondents. 5% of the respondents 
strongly disagreed that taxpayers have a good relationship with government; 6% disagreed; 2% undecided; 29% 
agreed and 58% strongly agreed. With respect to taxpayers trusting the state, 11% of the respondents strongly 
disagreed; 14% disagreed; 1% undecided; 35% agreed and 39% strongly agreed. Regarding fairness of the tax 
system, 17% of the respondents strongly disagreed; 19% disagreed; 13% undecided; 23% agreed and 28% strongly 
agreed. As concern the transparency of the government, 13% of the respondents strongly disagreed; 20% disagreed; 
14% not decided; 25% agreed, and 28% strongly agreed. Looking at fairness in the democratic political system, 
2% of the respondents strongly disagreed; 7% disagreed; 2% not decided; 29% agreed; and 60% strongly agreed. 
With regards to citizens’ personal satisfaction with the democratic political system, 13% of the respondents 
strongly disagreed; 15% disagreed; 18% not decided; 34% agreed, and 20% strongly agreed. Looking at national 
pride and a higher level of education, 10% of the respondents strongly disagreed; 26% disagreed; 10% not decided; 
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25% agreed; and 29% strongly agreed. 
Appendix 1(h) presents the taxpayers’ perception of the judicial system. Items here were: justice and fairness 
in trials, corruption and lack of credibility, taxpayers’ influence on government and politicians. Regarding the 
judicial system being just and fair in its trials, 32% of the respondents strongly disagreed; 23% disagreed; 20% 
undecided; 10% agreed and 15% strongly agreed. With respect to its being easily influenced by taxpayers, 
government and politicians, 26% of the respondents strongly disagreed; 14% disagreed; 1% undecided; 23% 
agreed and 36% strongly agreed. Regarding corruption and lack of credibility, 12% of the respondents strongly 
disagreed; 18% disagreed; 4% undecided; 37% agreed and 29% strongly agreed. 
On the other hand, appendix 2 presents the percentage of income declared to tax authorities by the taxpayer. 
This variable captures the perception of tax evasion by the taxpayer. From the result, 3% of the respondents 
declared their entire income to the tax authority; 11% declared from 80% less than 100% of their income to tax 
authority; 38% declared from 60% to less 80% of their income to tax authority; 39% declared from 40% to less 
60% of their income to tax authority and 9% declared less than 40% of their income to tax authority. Thus the 
majority of the taxpayers only declare from 40% to less than 60% of their income to tax authority.       
                                    
5. Discussions of Results  
The regression results of the determinants of tax evasion estimated using the ordered logit estimation technique 
were presented in table 2 below. It is observed from the percentage of income declared to tax authority given in 
appendix 2 that, there were five (5) levels of tax payment that were considered. Consequently, there were four cut 
off points presented in the results. The coefficients on the table are logodds. In the interpretation of the coefficients, 
a negative value showed that individuals did not pay all their taxes, hence increased the likelihood of tax evasion.  
From the result, the perception that taxes are high has a negative effect on the likelihood of tax evasion. The 
result specifically shows that a unit increase in the perception that taxes are high will reduce the probability of 
paying taxes by a log-odd of 0.6168. Translating the coefficient into the odd ratio, the result means that when the 
perception that taxes are high increases by 1 unit, the likelihood of not paying taxes will increase by 46%. This 
result is statistically significant at 5% level of significance since the p-value of 0.039 is less than 5%. It is supported 
by the findings in a study of the causes of tax evasion and corruption in the Indian income tax system, where Arora 
and Vanita (2010) disclosed that high tax rates constitute one of the main reasons why tax evasion thrives in India. 
This result further affirms the outcome of the study of the factors that influence tax evasion behaviour in Ghana 
by Ameyaw and Dzaka (2016), Tanzi (1983), and Allingham and Sandmo (1972), that high tax rates significantly 
provoke evasion. 
Table 2. Ordered logistic results on the determinants of tax evasion    
       Evasion  Coefficient Standard Error Z P>|z| 
High taxes  -0.616791** 0.299442 -2.06 0.039 
Poor public services -0.363396 0.381867 -0.95 0.341 
Income level   0.684951** 0.290868 2.35 0.019 
Evasion benefits outweigh detection penalties -0.923323** 0.467317 -1.98 0.048 
Complex and opaque tax -0.699828** 0.325020 -2.15 0.038 
Inefficient and corrupt tax -0.277970* 0.169069 -1.64 0.100 
Perception of judicial system 0.228317* 0.100868 2.26 0.025 
Cut1  2.589063 1.987901   
Cut2  4.80624 2.046254   
Cut3  5.641973 2.075818   
Cut4  9.324384 2.475175   
Number of obs         318    
LR chi2 (8)      17.56 Prob > chi2 = 0.0247 
Pseudo R2     0.1513    
*** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5% and * significant at 10%. 
Source: Authors’ computation 
Poor public services also have a negative effect on tax evasion. Specifically, from the result, an increase in 
the perception that public services are poor by a unit reduces the likelihood of paying the complete amount of taxes 
by a log-odd of 0.3634. Translating the coefficient into percentages, the result will specifically mean that an 
increase in the perception of poor public services reduces the probability of paying taxes by some 30%. However, 
this result is statistically insignificant since the p-value of 0.341 is greater than 10%. This result confirms the 
assertion by Martinez-Vazquez and (McNab, 2003; Pashev, 2005; EverestPhillips, 2008; Brautigam et al., 2008) 
that every taxpayer expects a fair service from the government for taxes paid.  
The more the taxpayer is deprived of basic services such as potable water, electricity, health, security, and 
good road networks, the level of noncompliance increases. This result validates the findings of Drogalas et al. 
Research Journal of Finance and Accounting                                                                                                                                    www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2222-1697 (Paper) ISSN 2222-2847 (Online) DOI: 10.7176/RJFA 
Vol.10, No.14, 2019 
 
86 
(2018) that tax evasion increases when taxpayers believe that public money is not efficiently allocated to the 
citizens. The inefficient allocation of public money in Cameroon could be linked to the fact that every year more 
money is allocated for investment projects in some regions of the country at the expense of others.  
The income level is positive, thus an increase in income level increases the probability of paying taxes thus 
reduces the likelihood of tax evasion. Specifically, from the result, a unit increase in income will increase the log-
odd of not evading taxes by 0.6850. Translating the coefficient into odd ratio, the result specifically shows that 
when income level increases, it becomes about 98% more likely that individuals will not evade taxes. This result 
is statistically significant at 5% level of significance since the p-value of 0.019 is less than 5%. Where low income 
leads to noncompliance, a reduction of tax rates could significantly improve compliance. Such a remedy supports 
the findings of Wadhwa and Pal (2012).  
In terms of the perception that evasion benefits outweigh detection and penalty, the coefficient is negative 
showing that individuals will evade taxes once they perceived that the benefits of evasion are more than the cost 
of detection and penalty. The result shows that the likelihood of paying taxes reduces by the log-odd of 0.9233. 
This result is statistically significant at 5% level of significance since the p-value of 0.048 is less than 5%. This 
result complies with the submission of Dalu, Maposa, Pabwaungana, and Dalu (2012) that taxpayers aim at 
minimising their financial position by evading taxes as long as the benefits from delinquency outweigh the risk of 
detection and penalty. A solution to this challenge may be in Fishlow and Friedman (1994) posit that higher 
penalties act as a deterrent and help to improve tax compliance. However, the application of more severe penalties 
can serve as a panacea as long as the tax evasions are detected. This will require the tax authorities to be efficient 
enough to detect the level of evasion. It will also require them to be morally upright not to interfere with the degree 
of evasion by falling prey to corruption and bribery. 
Complex and opaque tax laws also encourage individuals to evade taxes as shown by the negative coefficient. 
The result shows that an increase in the perception that the tax laws are complex and opaque will increase the log-
odd of not paying taxes by 0.6998. In terms of odd ratios, there is about 50% less likelihood of paying taxes if the 
tax laws are perceived to be complex and opaque. This result is statistically significant at 5% level of significance 
since the p-value of 0.038 is less than 5%. Arora and Vanita (2010) proposed as a solution a simplification of tax 
regulations and laws. Simplification of tax laws broadens tax education, hence tax compliance. 
Arora and Vanita (2010) disclosed that high tax rates, social acceptance of tax evasion, poor tax evasion 
detection mechanisms, low tax ethics, and corruption, constitute the main reasons why evasion thrives in India. 
The study furthermore revealed that the income tax authorities apart from being morally bankrupt wielded 
excessive discretionary powers that led to corruption. As a remedy, they proposed the justification of tax rates, 
simplification of tax regulations and laws. They also encouraged an extensive application of the tax system where 
tax is deducted at source, and proper processing and dissemination of tax information, in a bid to step up tax 
compliance. 
Inefficient and corrupt tax inspectors have a negative effect on the ability to pay taxes. In other words, when 
taxpayers perceive that the tax officials are inefficient and corrupt, the likelihood of evading taxes increases by a 
log-odd of 0.2780. Translating the coefficient into percentages, the result will specifically mean that when 
individuals perceive that tax inspectors are inefficient and corrupt, the likelihood not to pay all the taxes increases 
by about 32%. This result is statistically significant at 10% level of significance since the p-value of 0.100 is not 
greater than 10%. This result supports the disclosure by Arora and Vanita (2010) that poor tax evasion detection 
mechanisms upsurge tax evasion. It also agrees with Wadhwa and Pal (2012) who carried out forensic accounting 
and fraud examination in India to opine that corrupt and inefficient tax authorities are the principal causes of tax 
evasion.  
The judicial system is found to have a positive influence on the likelihood to pay taxes fully. That is, it 
decreases the likelihood of evading taxes. From the results, if taxpayers perceived that the judicial system is fair 
and just, they are encouraged to pay their taxes. The results specifically show that the log odds of not evading 
taxes will increase by 0.22832. Translating the coefficient into odd ratio, the result specifically shows that when 
the perception of judiciary fairness increases, the likelihood of individuals not evading taxes increases by 25.6%. 
This result is statistically significant at 5% level of significance and agrees with the findings of Vythelingum, 
Soondram, and Jugurnath, (2017) among Mauritian taxpayers that, tax compliance increases when the public has 
faith in the tax and legal systems being stable, fair and transparent, and seen to effectively fight against corruption. 
The judiciary in Cameroon should be able to make politicians accountable for their decisions and use of public 
money, in order to rebuild trust between the government and its taxpayers. 
 
6. Policy Implications, Recommendations and Conclusion 
The findings generated in this study of tax evasion in Cameroon reveal that high taxes, low-income level of 
taxpayers, evasion benefits outweighing detection and penalty, inefficient and corrupt tax officials, complex and 
opaque tax system, poor perception of the judicial system, and poor public services offered by the government are 
the fundamental causes of tax evasion in Cameroon. 
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To overcome the challenges of tax evasion, the Cameroon government should reduce and conscientiously 
justify its tax rates. The tax laws should be simplified and taxpayers or economic operators properly schooled 
through episodic seminars.  
The income level of taxpayers can be improved if the government ensures a more conducive business 
environment with enhanced availability and quality of basic amenities such as security, electricity supply, internet, 
water, health, and transportation network.   
Vis-à-vis tax evasion benefits outweighing tax detection and penalty, tax evasion penalties should be raised 
in order to discourage the practice. However, for this to be effective, the tax evasion itself must be uncovered, and 
not negotiated by unscrupulous tax authorities. In this regard, corrupt and inefficient tax inspectors must be 
identified and dealt with accordingly in order to forestall contamination of the few morally upright tax inspectors. 
Tax auditors and tax information processing officers should be knowledgeable, sincere, and patriotic.  
The judiciary in Cameroon is poorly perceived by taxpayers and this leads to tax noncompliance. This can be 
reversed if the judicial system gains independence and starts showing proof of fairness and transparency in 
handling tax-related matters, fighting against corrupt practices by both tax inspectors and taxpayers, and cause 
politicians to be accountable for their decisions and use of public money. 
Tax ethics should be introduced in schools so as to build a moral obligation in citizens to be tax compliant, 
tax authorities to be assiduous and honest, and politicians to be transparent and accountable. 
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Appendix 1: Determinants of tax evasion 
 (A) High tax rates (HTR) 
Items 
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Not 
decided 
Agree Strongly 
agree 
Total 
a) They don’t have enough money to pay 
all the tax there is. 
45 
13% 
70 
20% 
25 
7% 
102 
29% 
109 
31% 
351 
b) The tax rate is too high compared to the 
income made 
17 
5% 
39 
11% 
21 
6% 
144 
41% 
130 
37% 
351 
c) Many taxes to pay 59 
17% 
28 
8% 
38 
11% 
73 
21% 
150 
43% 
348 
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(B) Poor public services (PPS) 
Items Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Not 
decided 
Agree Strongly 
agree 
Total 
a) They don’t know what government 
does with the tax income 
42 
12% 
28 
8% 
4 
1% 
133 
38% 
143 
41% 
350 
b) The government does not adequately 
protect lives and property  
35 
10% 
46 
13% 
21 
6% 
119 
34% 
129 
37% 
350 
c) Government health services are 
generally poor  
70 
20% 
46 
13% 
28 
8% 
91 
26% 
116 
33% 
351 
d) Roads go for long without maintenance 35 
10% 
67 
19% 
14 
4% 
133 
38% 
101 
29% 
350 
e) Government expenditure is bias  66 
19% 
56 
16% 
70 
20% 
80 
23% 
77 
22% 
349 
 (C) Low income (LI) 
Items 
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Not 
decided 
Agree Strongly 
agree 
Total 
a) Business income fluctuates a lot 42 
12% 
80 
23% 
3 
1% 
121 
35% 
101 
29% 
347 
b) Most of the time the income is too low 63 
18% 
66 
19% 
17 
5% 
94 
27% 
108 
31% 
348 
c) Business sales are low 60 
17% 
63 
18% 
32 
9% 
112 
32% 
84 
24% 
351 
d) Cost of sales and/or cost of production 
is high 
81 
23% 
42 
12% 
39 
11% 
105 
30% 
84 
24% 
351 
(D) Evasion benefits outweigh detection and penalties (EBODP) 
Items 
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Not 
decided 
Agree Strongly 
agree 
Total 
a) In this way our business makes more 
profit 
70 
20% 
46 
13% 
49 
14% 
143 
41% 
42 
12% 
350 
b) Even when caught it can easily be 
settled 
52 
15% 
73 
21% 
46 
13% 
84 
24% 
95 
27% 
350 
c) The penalty for this can easily by paid 42 
12% 
60 
17% 
32 
9% 
112 
32% 
105 
30% 
351 
(E) Complex and opaque tax laws (COTL) 
Items 
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Not 
decided 
Agree Strongly 
agree 
Total 
a) The tax laws are not understood 
32 
9% 
42 
12% 
45 
13% 
112 
32% 
119 
34% 
350 
b) The tax regulations are too many and 
confusing 
35 
10% 
46 
13% 
28 
8% 
116 
33% 
126 
36% 
351 
c) The calculation is not easy to 
understand 
14 
4% 
21 
6% 
4 
1% 
77 
22% 
235 
67% 
351 
d) Copies of the tax code/law are available 
only to the tax inspectors 
4 
1% 
14 
4% 
42 
12% 
88 
25% 
203 
58% 
351 
(F) Inefficient and Corrupt Tax Inspectors (ICTI) 
Items 
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Not 
decided 
Agree Strongly 
agree 
Total 
a) They don’t trust the tax inspectors 73 
21% 
66 
19% 
31 
9% 
77 
22% 
101 
29% 
348 
b) They can easily bribe out their way 
56 
16% 
70 
20% 
83 
24% 
66 
19% 
73 
21% 
348 
c) They can easily negotiate with tax 
agents 
60 
17% 
77 
22% 
17 
5% 
84 
24% 
112 
32% 
350 
d) Tax auditors/inspectors don’t question 
amount  declared 
112 
32% 
70 
20% 
46 
13% 
60 
17% 
63 
18% 
351 
e) Tax agents are kind and accept pleas 
70 
20% 
52 
15% 
88 
25% 
67 
19% 
74 
21% 
351 
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(G) Tax payer perception of the judicial system 
Items 
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Not 
decided 
Agree Strongly 
agree 
Total 
a) Just and fair in its trials 112 
32% 
81 
23% 
70 
20% 
35 
10% 
53 
15% 
351 
b) Easily influenced by tax payers, 
government and politicians 
91 
26% 
49 
14% 
4 
1% 
81 
23% 
126 
36% 
351 
c) Corrupt and lacks credibility 42 
12% 
63 
18% 
14 
4% 
130 
37% 
102 
29% 
351 
 Source: Author’s computation 
 
Appendix 2: Percentage of income declared to tax authority 
Income declared to tax authority 
 
Number of 
respondents 
Percentage 
 
a) 100% 11 3% 
b) [80% and 100% [ 39 11% 
c) [60%  and 80%[ 133 38% 
d) [40% and 60%[ 137 39% 
e) Less than 40% 31 9% 
Source: Author’s computation 
 
